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Mirror Use by African Grey Parrots (Psittacus
erithacus)
Irene M. Pepperberg, Sean E. Garcia, Eric C. Jackson, and Sharon Marconi
University of Arizona

ABSTRACT
Two Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) were tested on various types of mirror use: mirror image
stimulation, mirror-mediated object discrimination, and a simple form of mirror-mediated spatial locating.
During exposure to a mirror, neither bird clearly demonstrated self-exploratory behavior but responded
instead in ways similar to those of marmosets, monkeys, dolphins, extremely young children(<18
months), and to the initial responses of orangutans and young chimpanzees. The parrots' behavior was
not a consequence of an inability to process mirrored information, because in subsequent tasks they used
mirrors to discriminate among exemplars and to locate hidden objects; these birds are the first
nonmammalian subjects to exhibit all these behavior patterns. Their behavior on all the tasks can be
compared to that of humans, great apes, dolphins, monkeys, and Asian elephants.

Mirror studies generally have two goals. One goal is to determine whether subjects demonstrate selfrecognition (e.g. Anderson. 1984; Gallup. 1970; Povinelli. Rulf, Landau, & Bierschwale, 1993; Swartz &
Evans, 1991) and, by extension, self-awareness and advanced social cognition (e.g., Gallup. 1991;
Mitchell, 1993). A second goal is to learn whether subjects that fail standard tests of self-recognition do so
because they lack capacities for processing mirror information (e.g. Menzel, Savage-Rumbaugh, &
Lawson, 1985; Povinelli, 1989). Studies usually include mirror-image stimulation, mirror-triggered search,
mirror-mediated object discrimination, mirror-mediated spatial locating, and mirror-guided reaching. After
describing what each of these tasks requires of a subject, we suggest a third goal for mirror studies: to
provide data for cross-species comparisons of cognitive and perceptual abilities.
During mirror-image stimulation, subjects generally view a reflection of their entire body (Amsterdam,
1972; Gallup. 1970). The length and number of mirror exposures varies among studies; data consist of
the type, number, and sometimes length of the observed mirror interactions. Mirror-image stimulation is
most often used to test self-recognition, but it also provides data on the developmental stage of children
(Amsterdam, 1972)1 and. for animals, on how extensively visual (rather than acoustic or olfactory) cues
mediate interactions in a given species (Anderson, 1984).
Mirror-triggered search is the most basic task in which mirrors are used to find hidden objects (Povinelli.
1989). Subjects learn that desirable items are likely found in a few fixed locations in the presence of a
mirror. The subject need not correlate the object's location and information in the mirror; a mirror is merely
a cue to begin a search (see Anderson. 1986; Menzel et al., 1985). Subjects who engage in mirror-

triggered searches are not necessarily able to use mirrors to locate, without trial and error, rewards that
are hidden in novel sites.
In mirror-mediated object discrimination, unlike mirror-triggered search, a subject uses a mirror to choose
between objects (e.g., hidden rewards and aversive stimuli). A subject must recognize some correlation
between an object and its reflection (Menzel et al.. 1985), but the subject need not understand that the
image is a representation of the actual object nor use the mirror to monitor its actions. Subsequent
appropriate responses to novel positive and negative objects in familiar locations rule out the possibility of
mirror-triggered search.
Mirror-mediated spatial locating and mirror-guided reaching require more advanced capacities. In the
former task, subjects use mirrors to locate, without trial and error, items hidden in novel locations. Here a
subject shows that it understands the correspondence between the location of the object in real space
and reflected information (Povinelli, 1989). Only in the latter task, however, must a subject also relate its
own movements to those depicted in the mirror (e.g., a sequence of fine hand movements; Itakura, 1987;
Menzel et al., 1985; Povinelli, 1989).
Mirror use thus examines not only self-recognition but also how animals respond to reflections and
process information about spatially displaced objects and actions. Specifically, because various mirror
tasks require different levels of information processing, we suggest that mirror studies can provide a
hierarchical scale for assessing and comparing perceptual and cognitive abilities of diverse species.
Animals that, for example, succeed on mirror-mediated discriminations but fail tests of mirror-mediated
locating demonstrate specific cognitive deficits compared with those that pass both tests. Of particular
interest are comparisons between mammals and nonmammals because of their neurological and
anatomical differences.
Several researchers have examined mirror use in nonhuman mammals. Mirror-image stimulation has
been studied in pygmy marmosets (Cebuella pygma; Eglash & Snowdon, 1983); elephants (Eleplws
maximus; Povinelli, 1989); dolphins (Tursiops truncatus; Marino, Reiss, & Gallup, 1994); chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes; Gallup, 1970); orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus; Robert, 1986; Suarez & Gallup, 1981);
and various monkey species (see reviews in Anderson, 1984, and Gallup, 1991). Although only some of
the great apes unequivocally demonstrate self-recognition (see review in Anderson, 1993), other
mammals can use mirrored information in various ways. Elephants (Povinelli, 1989) and monkeys (e.g.,
Cebus capucinus, Marchal & Anderson, 1993; Macaca mulatta, Anderson) 1986; Menzel et al., 1985;
Macaca fuscata fuscata, Itakura, 1987) were tested on mirror-triggered search and spatial locating, and
monkeys can perform mirror-mediated object discriminations. Monkeys (Itakura, 1987; Menzel et al.,
1985) and chimpanzees (Menzel et al., 1985) have been tested on mirror-guided reaching. The question
now is whether such capacities are limited to mammals.
With the exception of mirror-image stimulation studies that failed to show self-recognition (budgerigars
[Melopsittacus undulatus] and house sparrows [Passer domesticus domesticus], Gallup & Capper, 1970;
a kea [Nestor notabilis], Diamond & Bond, 1989; chickadees [Parus atricapillus], Censky & Ficken, 1982;
zebra finches [Poephila guttata], Ryan, 1978; glaucous-winged gulls [Larus glaucescens], Stout, Wilcox,
& Creitz, 1969; blue grouse [Dendragapus obscurus], Stirling, 1968; cedar waxwings [Bombycilla
cedrorum] and juncos [junco hyemalis], Andrews, 1966; and lovebirds [Agapornis roseicollis], Delsaut &
Roy, 1980),2 no comparable work has been performed on birds. Specifically, can subjects whose brains
are organized so differently from those of mammals (Striedter, 1994) and who lack hands and
comparable feet (and thus certain fine motor skills) use mirrored information in a manner similar to that of
mammals? Given that a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) has demonstrated cognitive capacities similar to
those of nonhuman primates and marine mammals (e.g., comprehension of concepts of category,

number, same-different, absence of information, relative size; Pepperberg, 1990a, 1990c, 1992, 1994a;
Pepperberg & Brezinsky, 1991), this species would be a good subject for studies of avian mirror use. We
therefore tested two Grey parrots on mirror-image stimulation, mirror-mediated object discrimination, and
mirror-mediated spatial locating. Each study was designed both to test for capacities comparable to those
of mammals and to accommodate avian anatomy. Experiments on mirror-guided reaching form the basis
of a separate study (see General Discussion).
Experiment 1. Mirror-Image Stimulation
Our first goal was to examine our subjects' reactions to their mirror images. Even if they failed to exhibit
those self-exploratory reactions that provide the rationale for conducting a test for self-recognition (Gallup
& Povinelli, 1993), we could compare our birds to mammals with respect to social, aggressive, and search
behavior. Too, because mirror use may develop with experience (Amsterdam, 1972; Anderson, 1984;
Field & Hogg, 1992; Gallup, 1987), our subjects required exposure to mirrors before we tested skills
involving discrimination and locating.
Method
Subjects and Housing
Subjects were hand-raised juvenile Grey parrots: Alo (female, 11 mos) and Kyaaro (male, 7.5 mos). They
lived in separate rooms but had had social interaction with other Grey parrots at their breeding facility and
with each other for their first month in the laboratory. They were part of an ongoing experiment on vocal
learning and cognition (Pepperbcrg, 1990a, 1993). When experiments were not in progress, birds could
be atop their cages, on "gyms" (branches nailed together) or parrot stands. Birds were confined to Hoei
cages (38 × 71 × 56 cm) when humans were absent and for sleeping. Water, Harrison's Bird Diet,
vegetables, fruit, dried pastas, and cereals were provided when neither testing nor training were in
progress. Before our study, their only exposures to reflections were occasional views of themselves in
water at the bottom of a sink when caretakers washed dishes.
Apparatus and Procedure
We used a glass mirror, 45 × 29.5 cm, with a brown, 2.5 cm plastic frame. On all but six trials, the mirror
leaned against a wall, with the 45 cm edge resting on a laboratory bench countertop. The mirror was
angled to provide ample space for a "behind-the-mirror" search. A parrot could view its entire body and
range over the entire counter (205 × 68 cm). To eliminate possible distractions, we removed all other
objects from the counter. For two trials for each bird, we placed the mirror so birds could walk on it. Birds
also received four trials each with the mirror placed in an open drawer under the counter so they could
look down to view their reflections.
As a control, two additional trials were administered with a nonreflective surface: We angled the mirror as
just described but covered its surface with cardboard. We could thereby determine whether the reflective
surface or merely the presence of the apparatus elicited the parrots' responses.
Exposure to the mirror, uncovered and covered, was limited to specific trials. Trials occurred at different
times on different weekdays so that the mirror was not associated with any other activity. Ala's first eight
mirror trials were 1 hr, but subsequent trials were 30 min because of her limited attention span. Kyaaro's
trials were only 15 min for two reasons: First, we wished to see if overall length of exposure affected
behavior; second, his attention span for any task was shorter than Ala's. Ala's 21 trials took place from
July to October 1991; Kyaaro's 23 trials spanned the period from August 1991 to May 1992.3

We collected data in real-time and also videotaped several complete and partial trials. An observer (Eric
C. Jackson or Sharon Marconi) sat across the room from the birds. Before data collection began, birds
were habituated, in the absence of the mirror, to the observer and video system. The observer operated
the camera to ensure that the birds were always in view. The parrots' frequent movements precluded use
of a stationary system in the absence of humans.
We confirmed coding of behavioral data through interobserver reliability scores. For the categories
described later, we compared codings of three live sessions (by Eric C. Jackson or Sharon Marconi) with
those of the corresponding videos (by Irene M. Pepperberg) for each bird. We computed Pearson
correlation coefficients for coded behaviors for which there were at least three instances on the data
sheets for one tape or session.
Results
Neither bird attended to the covered mirror. When placed in front of it, they walked away. The results
differ from those obtained by Anderson and Bayart (1985), whose monkeys showed immediate significant
interest in a nonreflective surface after ceasing to respond to the mirror. Thus any attention our birds
showed to the mirror was a consequence of its reflective surface.
In the presence of the mirrored surface, both birds engaged in some categories of behavior described for
children (Amsterdam, 1972), chimpanzees (Lin, Bard, & Anderson, 1992), marmosets (Eglash &
Snowdon, 1983), and dolphins (Marino et al., 1994): (a) little or no interest, (b) social behavior toward the
mirror or image (including aggressive acts), (c) searching behind the mirror, and (d) avoidance (Table 1).
We also observed behavior unique to birds: preening and ruffling feathers. For both birds, the mean
number of times they produced a behavior was often less than the standard deviation across trials (Table
1). For Alo and Kyaaro, the mean number of overall reactions were, respectively, 10.87 (SD = 9.56) and
33.76 (SD = 9.18)
Neither bird habituated to the vertical mirror. For Alo, no significant correlation existed between date of
session and lack of interest, R2 = .073, F(13, 15) = 1.03, p = .329; social acts, R2 = .07, F(13, 15) = 0.98,
2
p = .340; aggressive acts, R = .099, F(13, 15) = 1.44, p = .252; or searching (one instance only). For
2
Kyaaro, no significant correlation existed between date of session and lack of interest, R = .060, F(15,
2
2
17) = .954, p = .344; social acts, R = .069, F(13, 17) = 1.14, p = .302; or searching, R = .008, F(15, 17)
= .12, p = ns; but his aggressive acts significantly decreased over time: Session date and number of acts
2
were negatively correlated (-.58), and a linear regression demonstrated a small significant interaction, R
= .335, F(15, 17) = 7.56, p = .015.
Some behavior patterns were unique to each bird. During three sessions with a vertical mirror, Alo put a
foot against the mirror and placed her head so as to provide a simultaneous view of her foot and its mirror
image. This behavior was often correlated with scratching her foot against the mirrored surface. In two
sessions, Kyaaro engaged in what is called "peekaboo" in children: He stared at the mirror image, moved
sideways until his head was just out of range of the mirror, then quickly moved back into view. In other
sessions he said ''you come," "you climb,'' or "tickle" to the mirror.
Interobserver reliability figures that could be calculated were as follows: for Alo, beak touch to mirror, .95;
to/fro movement with respect to mirror, .87; peck frame, .95; preen, .98; head down to mirror, 1.0; for
Kyaaro, tap mirror, .87; preen, .95; grab edge of frame, .87; fluff/ruffle, 1.0; walk away, .5; head down, .5;
vocalize, .98; scratch, .95. For Kyaaro, only one disagreement existed in the "walk away" category, but
the small number of samples (2-3 codings per session) caused the effect of the disagreement to be large.

In the "head down" category, only two codings differed; in both cases, an additional entry was made from
videotape. "Head down" behavior is extremely brief and could easily have been missed in real time.
Discussion
Kyaaro was more consistent than Ala, but the mean number of times either bird produced a given
behavior was often less than the standard deviation across trials. Differences across trials, however,
seemed more indicative of a parrot's general activity level on a given day than its interest in the mirror.
Thus, despite variations in numbers of reactions per trial, we believe that the birds' behavior patterns
were salient.
The data suggest that both birds viewed the mirror image as a conspecific. Only Ala's repeated unique
act of scratching while viewing her foot and its image simultaneously suggests a search for a
correspondence between her actions and those in the mirror. Other actions-beak tapping, preening, and
vocalizing-cannot be interpreted unequivocally but are similar to ones that occur when two birds are
together.
Both parrots often tapped the mirror with opened beaks. Such behavior resembles "beak wrestling"
responses to a conspecific, during which birds approach one another with open beaks, then intertwine
beaks and engage in pushing, pulling, and sideways maneuvers. Opened-beak tapping might, however,
be interpreted as a self-guided action: Open-mouth postures of dolphins in front of a mirror are seen
either as exploratory or threat behavior (Marino et al., 1994), as are the actions of monkeys who both
touch and threaten their mirror images (Anderson, 1984).
Preening and head-scratching may be self-directed, but parrors often engage in such behavior when
alone or with conspecifics (Wolter, 1987). Grooming body parts that are observable only with mirrors
suggests self-recognition (Gallup, 1987), but parrots, unlike primates, see all body areas except parts of
their heads. Their behavior may thus be like that of some monkeys who increase self-scratching in the
presence of conspecifics and mirror images (e.g., Hall, 1962). Moreover, the action of bending their
heads toward the mirror was likely related to preening: Both birds (and a third parrot, Alex) thereby
attempt to elicit preening from trainers and each other (note Wolter, 1987). Thus, our subjects' preening
and head-scratching behavior in front of the mirror are likely social responses to perceived conspecifics.
Because these parrots are part of a study on learned vocal communication (Pepperberg, 1994b), we
noted their vocal behavior in the presence of a mirror. Kyaaro vocalized (e.g., "you come," "tickle") while
attending to his reflection but may have directed his utterances to the trainer rather than his image (i.e.,
not to "another" parrot). Such utterances are also common in solitary sound play (see Pepperberg, Brese,
& Harris, 1991). Alo, in contrast, vocalized only once to the mirror in the absence of other vocal stimuli
(e.g., voices outside her room). Absence of auditory feedback, like the absence of olfactory cues for dogs
(Gallup, 1987), may have affected her behavior. Lovebirds, for example, prefer perches that provide
mirrors and auditory input to perches that provide only mirrors (Delsaut & Roy, 1980). Parrots use vocal
cues in social interactions (Gnam, 1988; Mebes, 1978); without such cues, vocal responses may have
become irrelevant.

Table 1. Reactions to Mirror Image Stimulation

Behavior
Little or no interest
Reach toward observer
Peck at herself
Reach toward cage/floor
Peck at frame
Receive tickles
Social behavior
Put head between her legs
Lift foot toward mirror
Stretch neck
Walk in circles on mirror
Bob head
Move to/fro in relation to mirror
Aggression (full feather display)
Touch beak to mirror
Tap beak at mirror
Open beak at mirror
Put head down toward mirror
Rub body against mirror
a
Preen
a
Vocalize
Searching behavior
Look behind mirror
Avoidance behavior
Fear
Other
Look under counter
Reach for object on mirror
Pacing
b
"Curious" looks at mirror

Total number of times behavior observed
Mirror vertical
Mirror under counter
Mirror horizontal
(15 trials)
(4 trials)
(2 trials)
No.
No.
No.
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
A: Alo
20
0
1
23
6

1.34
.06
1.53
.40

.26
2.13
.63

8
12
8
NA
1
8
10
30
0
0
12
5
16
0

.53
.80
.53

1.13
2.04
1.13

.06
.53
.66
2.00

.26
.92
1.11
2.10

1

1.63

.80
.34
1.07

1.01
.90
1.39

.06

.26

0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
2
0
4
4
3
0
2
1

.50

.71

.25

.50

.50

1.0

.25
.50

.50
1.0

1.00
1.00
.75

.82
1.16
.96

.50
.25

.58
.50

0

0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
3
0

.50

.71

.50

.71

1.50

.71

2.50

3.54

1.50

2.12

2.50

3.54

0

0

2

.50

.58

0

NA
NA
0
0

6
4
2
11

1.50
1.00
.50
2.75

1.30
.82
.58
3.10

NA
NA
0
5

B: Kyaaro
Little or no interest
Walk away
41
2.41
2.00
8
2.00
1.83
3
1.50
.71
Walk toward observer
5
.29
.47
0
0
Watch observer
9
.53
.80
0
2
1.00
1.41
Chew toes
1
.06
.24
0
0
Grab frame
97
5.71
2.89
18
4.50
3.11
4
2.00
2.82
Social behavior
Move toward mirror
3
.18
.39
0
0
Put head down toward mirror
49
2.88
2.06
9
2.25
1.50
9
4.50
2.12
Tap beak at mirror
104
6.12
2.89
18
4.50
2.08
13
6.50
2.12
c
41
2.18
2.01
3
.75
.96
1
.50
.71
Fluffs/ruffles
Stare at herself
28
1.65
1.62
5
1.25
2.50
3
1.50
2.12
a
77
3.88
1.99
15
3.75
3.30
10
5.00
1.41
Preen/Scratch
a
116
7.00
4.12
63
15.75 11.27
13
6.50
9.19
Vocalize
d
3
.18
.53
1
.25
.50
0
"Peekaboo"
Searching behavior
Look behind/over edge of mirror
19
1.12
1.54
0
5
2.50
2.12
Other
Appear to watch observer in mirror
3
.18
.53
0
0
Look under counter
NA
11
2.75
3.20
NA
a
b
This behavior could be self- or other-directed (see text). "Curious" describes a look in which the pupils flash (change in size) while the
c
d
bird has its head close to the mirror. This behavior is generally considered aggressive. "Peekaboo" labels a behavior that would be so
described in children.

4

Data on exposure to the horizontal mirror demonstrate the need for future research. Both birds reacted
somewhat more aggressively (e.g., AJo with rapid approaches and withdrawals, with erect feathers and
open beak; Kyaaro with ruffles and fluffs) to the upright than to the horizontal mirror (Table 1). Alo
responded aggressively to the vertical mirror 10 times (M = .067, SD = 1.113); Kyaaro, 41 times (M =
2.18, SD = 2.01). On all types of horizontal trials, Alo reacted aggressively only twice (M = .34, SD =
0.516); Kyaaro reacted aggressively four times (M = .67, SD = 0.817). Although the difference in number
of aggressive acts for Kyaaro was significant (t = 2.42, p < .05), this result may be confounded because
Kyaaro's aggression to the upright mirror declined over time and horizontal trials were interspersed
among vertical ones. Nevertheless, differences in aggressive reactions may be real: An upright mirror
presents an image like a conspecific; the image in a flat mirror is one birds might see in a reflective
surface in the wild (e.g., a pool of water). Possibly, exposure to horizontal rather than vertical mirrors
might facilitate self-recognition. We are examining further the differences between horizontal and vertical
presentations.
Kyaaro and Alo also exhibited search behavior. Kyaaro, the younger bird, persisted in searching, but no
significant correlation existed between this behavior and exposure time. Alo searched only in her first
session. Such behavior is common in subjects who do not demonstrate mirror self-recognition: children 7
to 14 months old (Amsterdam, 1972; cf. Dixon, 1957), elephants (Povinelli, 1989), and several monkey
species (Anderson, 1984). Such behavior suggests that the reflected image is regarded as another
individual (Gallup, 1968).
Both birds, but particularly the elder, Alo, did not simply ignore the mirror in several sessions but actively
walked away from it and toward the observer. In children, such behavior emerges in their second year,
before self-recognition but after the age at which they search for their image. Amsterdam (1972) suggests
that such behavior is a precursor to self-recognition (e.g., the image is no longer viewed as a "playmate"),
but for animals this reaction is interpreted as avoidance of an apparent abnormally behaving conspecific
(Anderson & Bayart, 1985; Zazzo, 1979).
For some mammals, youth and sometimes exposure can affect mirror responses; conceivably, our birds
reacted similarly. Children must he around 2 years old, chimpanzees even older, and both may need
adequate mirror exposure (Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; cf. Povinelli et al., 1993) before demonstrating
self-exploratory patterns (e.g., novel mouth movements they follow in a mirror, using a mirror to guide
their hands to scratch their faces; Lin et al., 1992) that indicate that a mark test for self-recognition
(Gallup, 1970) might be successful. Parrot lifespans are comparable to those of chimpanzees and
humans, and at least one species (kea) has a similarly extended juvenile learning stage (Diamond &
Bond, 1991). Our birds were under 2 years old and had limited mirror exposure (14.5 hr for Alo, 5.75 hr
for Kyaaro) compared with that for dolphins (33 hr, Marino et al., 1994) or some chimpanzees (80 hr,
Gallup, 1970; but see Povinelli et al., 1993). Alo, the elder, who had more mirror exposure, responded
more similarly to older children. Moreover, Alo, in a separate study, demonstrated some interest in
markings (red, yellow, blue Sharpie) placed on her feet while she was anesthetized for a nonsurgical
procedure. Marking was done late one evening; the next morning, when fully recovered from the
anesthesia, she noticed the marks as she walked toward her breakfast and spent 1 min alternating
between walking and intently staring and chewing at her feet. Such intense staring was never observed
during baseline trials, although chewing was common. For these reasons, studies of mirror-image
stimulation are continuing and tests for self-recognition are planned.
However, because our birds did not clearly exhibit self-exploratory behavior patterns, we proceeded at
this time to test them instead on other forms of mirror use that would compare their cognitive capacities to
those of mammals. Such a goal was reasonable because our data suggested they might engage in
mirror-mediated object discrimination and spatial locating: They both looked under and explored the

hidden edge of a mirror placed under a counter (Table 1). We thus decided to proceed with these two
tasks, testing the one that required less advanced cognitive skills first.
Experiment 2. Mirror-Mediated Object Discrimination
Several species of monkey (Brown, McDowell, & Robinson, 1965; Itakura, 1987; Menzel et al., 1985;
Tinklepaugh, 1928) and at least one fish (Barbus; Moody, 1975) learn to use mirror images to
discriminate among objects. Discriminatory capacity per se is not important, because mirror-mediated
discriminations should be no more difficult than those involving real objects (Menzel et al., 1985; but see
Lohmann, Delius, Hollard, & Friesel, 1988). The mirror-mediated task is, however, a control for mirrortriggered search: A subject that performs mirror-mediated object discrimination is not using a mirror
simply as a cue to begin automatic searching in a familiar location. We therefore tested whether our birds
would use information from a mirror to retrieve positive items hidden in a box and leave the test area
when hidden stimuli were aversive.
Figure 1. Apparatus for mirror-mediated object discrimination: Box used to hide the designated object is at
an angle to the mirror.

Method
Subjects and Housing
The subjects and their housing were identical to those in Experiment 1.
Apparatus and Procedure
We used the mirror and countertop from Experiment 1. We placed a cardboard box (16 × 11 × 7.5 cm) so
its side was 6 cm from that of the mirror; the open end was either parallel to and 25 cm from the front of

the mirror or rotated by 45° (Figure 1). Subjects could see inside only by using the mirror. We used
5
rewards (piece of dry pasta) versus no reward as a go/no-go task on habituation trials. Test trials used
positive rewards (for Alo, pasta; for Kyaaro, a wooden spool or a plastic cup) versus negative stimuli (for
Alo, some plastic toy animals; for Kyaaro, pipe cleaners and rubber or plastic toys in the first round of
testing and in the second, a small version of the towel that had been used to restrain him for medical
treatments). We categorized stimuli as positive or negative on the basis of a bird's initial reaction when
the items were introduced into its play area. We ran additional trials with novel items. For Alo, positive
novel items were a large ball bearing, plastic balls, toy trucks, wooden pencils, a clicking metal toy frog;
negative objects were new plastic toy animals. For Kyaaro, novel positive items were pasta, pens, a role
of tape, and leather strips; we retained the towel as the negative item.
Although we usually avoid food rewards (Pepperberg, 1990b), pasta was a particularly potent reward for
Alo. To ensure that she located pasta by sight and not odor, we ran control tests before and after the
experiment. A student held Alo so that she could not see around the student's body; another student
placed pasta in easily accessible locations that were or were not directly visible. Alo located the pasta in
2
10 of 10 visually accessible trials and did not search in 10 of 10 hidden trials, χ (1, N = 20) = 20.00, p <
.0001. Pasta thus did not emit olfactory cues sufficient to elicit search behavior.
Habituation trials. A trial began when one of us placed a bird on a perch out of sight of the box. This
person next performed either a real or sham baiting of the box. Presence or absence of pasta was
determined by a coin flip. Being careful to avoid looking at the mirror or bird, this person put the bird on
the counter in a predetermined position, situated him- or herself out of direct sight of the box, then
recorded the subject's behavior. Trials lasted until the bird reacted to the mirror or 15 min had elapsed. As
in Experiment 1, we conducted trials at different times on different days of the week. Alo had 22 go/no-go
habituation trials; Kyaaro had 20.
Test trials. Test trials differed from habituation trials in three ways. First, we used negative stimuli in place
of an empty box and varied the positive rewards. Second, the box's position varied in one third of the
trials (Figure 1), so a bird not only had to walk around the edge of the box but also away from the mirror
to obtain the hidden object. Third, two thirds of Alo's and half of Kyaaro's test trials used additional
controls against experimenter cuing: On these trials, a student who did not know what was positive and
negative for a given bird baited the box, positioned the parrot appropriately, and then left the room. The
observer, who could not observe this process and could not see into the box, then collected data.
The number of trials differed for each parrot. Alo received 120 trials, evenly divided between positive and
negative stimuli, between June 1992 and April 1993, with breaks for surgery. Kyaaro received 143
positive and 105 negative trials between October 1992 and June 1993, with breaks for surgery. Kyaaro
had more trials for four reasons: First, he had received less total mirror exposure than Alo in Experiment
1. Second, his habituation data suggested that he was still somewhat fearful of the box. Third, a large
number of discrimination trials might allow us to observe a learning curve if he was still gaining
information about mirrors and boxes. Fourth, because Kyaaro quickly habituated to negative reinforcers
on the first round of test trials (as discussed later), we administered a second round. The second round
was a subset of the overall trials, 73 positive and 47 negative, that occurred between January 1993 and
June 1993. All these trials were performed "blind." We determined the frequency of Kyaaro's negative
versus positive trials by a coin flip.
Detour trials. Placement of the mirror against the wall at an angle did not prevent (see Table 1) but might
have discouraged our subjects from searching behind the mirror. Search behavior is common in children
up to 10 months old (Baudonniere, 1993; Zazzo, 1975) and possibly up to 22 months of age (Loveland,
1987). To team whether our parrots would search if given a better opportunity and despite additional

mirror experience, we ran trials (a) by placing the mirror, supported by plexiglass, in the center of the
counter and (b) 6 months after completion of the mirror-mediated spatial locating experiments described
below. Behind-the-mirror searches at this point would call into question the hierarchical nature of the
cognitive capacities proposed as necessary for success on different types of mirror tasks. We ran a full
set of trials only with Kyaaro (see footnote 3).
"Clear" trials. These tests would determine whether Kyaaro indeed differentiated reflected from
nonreflected information. Two-year-old children cannot: Although they locate reflected objects without
using knowledge of their self-image (Robinson, Connell, McKenzie, & Day, 1990), they cannot distinguish
between seeing themselves in a mirror and seeing a twin behind a glass plate (Zazzo, 1975, 1979). The
twin task demonstrated that the children not only failed at self-recognition but also that they did not
understand that the mirror reflected information on their side of the frame and that glass transmitted
information from the other side (Loveland, 1987).
We could not replicate the twin task but could examine whether the ability being tested-that of
differentiating between reflected and nonreflected information-was present in a parrot. Thus we
interspersed detour trials randomly with "clear" trials. In clear trials, we placed identical boxes behind and
in front of an empty frame; each box contained either a positive or negative item. We used an empty
frame because we could not obtain completely nonreflective glass. A bird that walked around or through
the frame to obtain a positive object and ignored the box facing the frame would show it knew whether it
was receiving reflected or nonreflected information. We ran trials with a negative object behind the frame
and a positive item in front to test whether the bird had simply learned to walk around the frame. To learn
whether Kyaaro would "spook" at the novel apparatus, we gave him one pretrial with an empty frame and
a single object placed behind it prior to the actual tests.
Results
Alo
Habituation trials. Alo searched the box in 18 of 22 trials whether or not pasta was present (i.e., searched
on 9 "go" and 9 "no-go" trials). The 4 trials in which she did not search occurred in the first 7 trials. She
then chewed on and looked in the box on every trial. Her latency of approach also decreased as the
experiment progressed: Her approach took 5 min on Trial 1, but only 1 min on Trial 5; by Trial 12, she
approached the box in 3-8 s.
Test trials. Ala used the mirror to distinguish items. When the observer baited the box, she looked in the
box after viewing the mirror image in 18 of 20 positive trials and retreated on 16 of 20 negative trials. In
blind tests, her score for parallel mirror trials was 19 of 20 for positive trials and 18 of 20 for negative
trials; for trials with the box angled to the mirror, her positive and negative scores, respectively, were 20 of
20 and 19 of 20. In all positive tests, she immediately walked to the box and retrieved the pasta; she
never tapped at the mirror nor approached the mirror more closely than the box. In tests for difference in
proportions at the .05 confidence level, her scores are not significantly different for blind and regular trials
and parallel versus angled presentations on, respectively, negative and positive trials. We therefore
lumped all data (57 of 60 responses appropriate for positive reward, 53 of 60 responses appropriate for
negative stimuli) for chi-square tests. Alo's results were significant at the p < .0001 level, χ2(1, N = 120) =
80.23. When we used novel objects (toys instead of pasta for positive stimuli and novel plastic animals as
negative stimuli), she responded equally well: She retrieved the objects on 5 of 5 positive trials and
walked away on 5 of 5 negative trials (binomial test, chance of .5, p = .001).

Figure 2. Kyaaro's habituation to negative stimuli. After 15 to 20 exposures to the originally negative items,
Kyaaro began not merely to habituate, but to treat them as positive rewards.

Kyaaro
Habituation trials. Kyaaro searched the box in 10 of 20 trials, but his behavior was not correlated with the
presence of pasta. He did, however, look in the box on 5 of his final 6 "go" trials.
First-round test trials. Kyaaro at first did not appear to succeed in this task. He looked in the box on 60 of
70 positive trials but retreated on only 24 of 58 negative trials. His data and behavior suggested, however,
that he not only had habituated to the objects used as negative stimuli (Figure 2) but actually learned to
treat them as positive rewards. A binomial test showed that, overall, he approached these objects more
often than by chance (p = .044). When we reevaluated his data, basing our statistics only on the first 10
2
exposures to each positive and negative stimulus (40 trials total), his performance was significant, χ (1, N
= 40) = 8.29, p < .004.
Second-round test trials. With a towel as the consistent negative stimulus, Kyaaro used the mirror to
distinguish items. He looked in the box after viewing the mirror image in 59 of 73 positive trials and
2
retreated on 40 of 47 negative trials. His results were significant at the p < .0001 level, χ (1, N = 120) =
50.21. He was also correct on all five trials that used novel positive stimuli.
"Clear" trials. In the habituation trial with an empty frame with a positive object behind it, Kyaaro did not
immediately walk around or through the frame. He glanced at the place where the object would have
been hidden in mirror trials several times before he walked through the frame to obtain the desirable
object.
On 29 of 30 formal trials (14 positive in front/negative in back; 15 negative in front/positive in back), he
consistently obtained the positive reward, either by going to the box in front of the frame or walking
around to the box in back. On one trial (midway through the series), he did not approach the apparatus
and appeared scared of the negative object behind the frame. His results were significant at the p < .0001
2
level, χ (2, N = 30) = 30.00.
6

Detour trials. On only 2 of 33 detour trials did Kyaaro react incorrectly. He once looked in the near box
that held a negative stimulus and once walked around the apparatus to recover a negative stimulus. He

appropriately retreated on 14 trials and looked in the box in 17 trials. His results were significant at the p <
2
.0001 level, χ (2, N = 33) = 29.22.
Discussion
During habituation trials, both birds learned not to fear the box. Though the data suggest that, unlike
monkeys (Itakura, 1987), they did not learn about mirror use, other interpretations are possible. For Alo,
interaction with the box became a reward: In 13 of 22 trials, she approached the box without looking at
the mirror. Too, although Kyaaro's overall score was at the level of chance, scores on his last 6 positive
trials suggest he learned that the box could be a source of reward.
These interpretations appear justified given the birds' performance on test trials. Alo avoided the box on
most negative trials and approached on most positive trials. Kyaaro's data were clearly affected by his
habituation to the negative stimuli. When tests were rerun with a small towel (which was associated with
strongly aversive medical treatment), his level of accuracy matched Ala's. The mirror, therefore, was not
simply a cue to begin a search, but a tool that provided search information. Because there was no
difference on either of the birds' scores on blind trials versus those with knowledgeable observers, they
worked on the basis of what they saw in the mirror and not on external cues provided by humans.
According to Gallup (1982), one criterion for determining whether an animal processes mirror information
to respond to objects is that it "respond appropriately by turning away from the mirror to gain more direct
access to the object of the reflection" (p. 240; see also Robinson et a!., 1990). Unfortunately, we cannot
test whether a parrot would, for example, turn away from a mirror to obtain an object placed directly
behind it: The position of parrots' eyes would afford a simultaneous view of the mirror reflection and the
object. A parrot will, however, walk around the edge of a box angled to, and thus somewhat away from,
the mirror to obtain the hidden reward. Responses did not differ from trials in which the box was parallel
to the mirror. In both situations, after looking in the mirror from behind the box, a bird walked directly to
the box on positive trials: It never avoided the box, dithered between the image and the object, or
attempted to retrieve the mirror image.
In most mirror-mediated discrimination experiments (e.g., ltaknra, 1987; Menzel et a!., 1985), animals are
repeatedly tested with a single set of positive and negative stimuli. Subjects may thereby respond using
an associative process (i.e., learn that one type of mirror cue leads to something positive and another to
something negative, without necessarily recognizing that mirror information is about specific items). Both
birds, however, responded appropriately on all trials in which we hid novel stimuli. Such data suggest they
were processing the information specifically rather than generally.
Kyaaro's reactions on detour and clear trials suggested that he differentiated reflected and nonreflected
information. His inappropriate behavior on a detour trial that had a negative stimulus in front of the mirror
was intriguing. He viewed the reflection of the negative item, backed off sideways (parallel to the mirror),
stopped at the edge of the mirror, and peered behind it. Interestingly, this trial occurred after several clear
trials in which walking around the frame had led to a reward. In clear trials, however, he did not examine
the apparatus and then sidle off; rather he detoured around the frame if such behavior was appropriate.
Whether in this detour trial he was checking for hidden rewards is unclear, but his behavior was different
from previous or subsequent trials. For all detour versus clear trials, Kyaaro, like children, need not have
used presence or absence of his reflection as a cue (see Robinson et al., 1990), because the procedure
also tested whether he could use visual information (i.e., process the difference between reflected and
real information) about his surroundings. The data demonstrate that he did not respond to the apparatus
in a rote manner.

In sum, the data suggest that Grey parrots can perform mirror-mediated object discrimination. They
avoided negative items and approached positive items on the basis of mirror information. They responded
as appropriately to novel as to familiar stimuli. They responded without verbal prompts, such as those
given to children, to find the object or attend to the mirror (Robinson et al., 1990). One might nevertheless
argue that the mirror was irrelevant: The birds checked the box unless frightened by the vision of negative
stimuli; they need not have realized they were seeing an image of the contents of the box. This
explanation cannot be entirely discounted. However, had the birds simply reacted to the presence or
absence of fear, they would have always retreated on negative trials and not have made any errors.
Kyaaro's reactions during clear trials also suggest, although cannot prove, that he understood the concept
of an image versus an object. When the negative item was in view behind the frame, he explored the
positive box in front and did not simply move away. Moreover, because Kyaaro was correct on all but one
trial, and this error occurred in the middle of the series, he did not simply learn an association between
presence versus absence of a mirror and an appropriate action. In some sense, however, such
discussion is irrelevant, because a mirror-mediated discrimination task is not designed to test whether
subjects realize that they are seeing a representation, but only whether an image provides the same
source of information as the object itself (i.e., if the subject correlates the object and its image). On those
grounds, we suggest that the parrots did indeed perform mirror-mediated object discriminations.
Experiment 3. Mirror-Mediated Spatial Locating
Mirror-mediated spatial locating requires use of a mirror to choose between possible locations of hidden
objects. The task, unlike mirror-guided reaching, does not require moment-to-moment information
processing to provide feedback about the status of the search but is more complicated than a mirrortriggered search, in which a mirror is merely a cue to begin exploring areas likely to provide rewards. In
mirror-mediated spatial locating, a subject must use information contained in the reflected image to
choose which of several, often contiguous, areas is correct. Thus, a subject must understand the
correspondence between the location of the object in real space and the information in the reflection
(Povinelli, 1989); i.e., use a spatial representation to solve the problem. Such a task thus requires a
higher order of information processing than does mirror-mediated discrimination. Japanese monkeys, for
example, have learned this ability (ltakura, 1987), but no comparable data exist for birds. Our birds'
success on mirror-mediated object discrimination, which showed that they could go beyond mirrortriggered searches, suggested that Grey parrots would be good candidates for testing mirror-mediated
spatial locating.
Method
Subjects and Housing
The subjects and their housing were the same as in Experiment 1.
Apparatus and Procedure. Part 1
We used the mirror from Experiment 1 and a drawer underneath the countertop. Pieces of posterboard
divided the overhang of the countertop above the drawer into three 17 -cm spaces: A, B, and C (Figure
3). Edges of the posterboard dividers were flush with the underside of the countertop. A parrot looking
into one section could not see into the others. The mirror reflected the entire underside of the counter; a
"lip" on this underside was a further precaution against inadvertent cues. Additional trials tested whether
birds could find a reward in the absence of mirror cues.
As in Experiment 2, birds had habituation and test trials. To begin a trial, we placed a bird where it could
not sec the counter while a trainer baited one of the three sections and covered the apparatus with

cardboard. The choice of position was randomized, but no position was used more than twice in a row. In
habituation and a portion of the test trials (1/3 for Alo and 1/2 for Kyaaro), the observer was the baiter; in
blind trials, the observer did not know which section was baited. In both cases, the observer, looking at
the bird and not the apparatus, then placed the bird at a standard position 50 cm from the edge of the
counter and removed the cardboard that covered the apparatus. The parrot could not see the bait without
looking in the mirror or under the counter.
Figure 3. Apparatus for mirror-mediated spatial locating procedure for both birds.

During habituation trials, which were learning trials, birds could search until they found the bait (pasta).
Initially, no barriers divided the counter; habituation ended when a bird used the mirror to view the
underside of the counter to find the pasta or after 20 attempts, whichever came first. Birds were
habituated to dividers in 20 subsequent trials or when they began to use the mirror, whichever came first.
After habituation, a parrot had only one chance to use the mirror to locate the pasta; a trial ended with the
first movement of its head into A, B, or C after it had scanned the mirror. Alo received 5 trials per week for
a total of 62 blind and 30 observer-baited trials from November 1992 to June 1993; Kyaaro received 15
7
trials per week for a total of 60 blind and 60 observer-baited trials from June to August 1993.
Apparatus and Procedure. Part 2
To show mastery of mirror-mediated spatial locating, a subject must use a mirror to find objects hidden in
novel positions. We therefore devised two sets of novel trials. In the first set, we simply modified Part 1 by
dividing the ledge into four rather than three compartments. The under-the-counter location remained
constant, but its spatial configuration was altered. Because Kyaaro had a position preference (discussed
later), we gave him an additional series of tests before advancing to the next set of trials: We backtracked
to the three-position task, placing negative stimuli in two compartments and a positive item in the third,
and then repeated the experiment with four compartments. In the second set of novel trials, mirrors
reflected information from above rather than below a barrier that encircled one wall and part of another
(Figure 4). We divided the ledge into eight sections, each 17 cm; the reward-pasta-was hidden randomly
among these sections. We also included trials in which rewards were present (a) without mirrors, (b) with

covered mirrors, and (c) were not reflected in the mirror. In all trials in Part 2 the observer was unaware of
the location of the pasta.
Figure 4. Apparatus for mirror-mediated spatial locating transfer procedure for Alo.

Results
Habituation Trials
Both birds habituated quickly. On the first two trials without dividers, Alo attended to her reflection more
than the pasta; she retrieved the pasta on her next trial. Kyaaro ignored the pasta on his first trial but
found it on the second. Both birds were also initially more interested in chewing the dividers than the
pasta. After six trials in which Ala had chewed the dividers, we placed a presumed negative stimulus in
one section and the pasta in another. She retrieved the negative stimulus and then began to attend to the
mirror cues. Kyaaro was dissuaded from chewing by hearing "No." In his first six trials (pasta twice in
each location). He searched each of the partitions in order (A, B, C) until he located the pasta. When
given only one chance to find the pasta on the next six trials (pasta twice in each location), he began to
use the mirror rather than search in order. Ala had a total of 12 habituation trials; Kyaaro had 14.
Test Trials. Part 1
Both birds' data from blind and observer-baited trials (54 of 62 correct and 24 of 30 trials correct for Alo;
48 of 60 correct and 44 of 60 correct for Kyaaro) were not significantly different at the .05 level on a test
for difference in proportions, so for each bird we combined blind and observer-baited trials for statistical
analysis. All of Kyaaro’s observer-baited trials preceded his blind trials; the data thus showed that his
accuracy was not based on human cues or experience.
Alo's overall performance, 84.8% correct, was significant for each site (Table 2; binomial test. chance =
1/3). p < .0001. Although she appeared somewhat biased toward Site B (Table 2), a test on her
2
distribution of errors showed that this bias was not statistically significant, χ (2, N = 14) = 2.090, p =

.3516. Most errors occurred at the beginning of testing and after a 3-week hiatus in testing during a
vacation and intersession break (Figure 5).
Kyaaro’s overall performance. 76.6% correct, was also significant for each site (Table 3; binomial test,
chance of 1/3, p ≤ .006). Kyaaro, however, had a clear position preference (Table 3). His distribution of
2
errors was significantly different from chance, χ (4, N = 28) = 17.63. p = .0015. He would look in the
mirror in order, A→B→C, and if the reward was not in A, often chose B before looking in all three areas.
Such behavior led him to be least correct when a reward was in C.
Table 2. Ala's Position Preferences in Mirror·Mediated Searches
No. of times Alo chose each site
Pasta location

A

B

C

A

24

7

1

B

0

30

0

C

1

5

24

Trials Without Mirror Cues
Neither bird succeeded when we covered the mirror with cardboard. On their first trials, Alo failed to find
the pasta, and Kyaaro refused to search. On subsequent trials with a covered mirror, Alo refused to look
in the apparatus; she looked at the cardboard and moved away. In subsequent trials Kyaaro either
refused to search or went directly to Site A, whether or not pasta was there.
Test Trials in Novel Positions. Part 2
Four positions. Both birds succeeded in choosing among four sites. Alo was correct on six of eight trials,
including the first trial. Her results were significant (binomial test, chance of 1/4, p = .0038). Kyaaro was
correct on five of eight trials, including his first three trials. His results were significant (binomial test,
chance of 1/4, p = .0231), but he consistently erred on end sites: both times on A and once on D. Both
birds thus adapted to minimal novelty, but Kyaaro favored middle positions.
Kyaaro's position problems declined after we returned to the three-position task and gave him six trials
that encouraged him to look carefully in all sections. In these trials we placed moderately negative stimuli
in two sites and pasta in a third; Kyaaro avoided negative items (rubber animals) on the first three trials
and then chose (and played with) one of these objects on subsequent trials. When four compartments
were reintroduced, he was correct on six of eight trials, with one error in A and one in B. His results were
again significant (binomial test, chance of 1/4, p = .0038).
Overhead mirror. On novel placement trials in which she had to look above a shelf, Alo responded
appropriately. She did not find the reward when the mirror was covered (4 trials). When pasta was placed
in an area not reflected in the mirror (4 trials), she checked the mirror but did not search. On eight trials
when both pasta and mirror cues were present, she was correct on six trials. Her scores were significant
at the .008 level, χ2(2, N = 16) = 9.6. She also had three mistrials. Once, she used the mirror to search
correctly, but the pasta was placed too far back for her physically to obtain it. In two other mistrials, she
could see pasta reflected indirectly by the mirror placed at right angles to the hiding spot; she searched
near the correct site but could not be expected to search appropriately. We reran additional trials with a
covered mirror at the end of the experiment to ensure that the test situation had not become a cue to
search: Alo scanned the area, then proceeded to preen.

We could not perform transfer trials with mirrors above Kyaaro's head. Even after several weeks of
habituation, he remained frightened of the apparatus. He would either cower in a comer or jump off the
laboratory bench.
Figure 5. Alo's learning curve for mirror-mediated spatial locating. Her performance improved until she
reached 100% accuracy, although her accuracy then decreased somewhat. Following a subsequent 3-week
break in testing, her performance deteriorated (Trials 16-18) before returning to 100% accuracy.

Discussion
Both birds used a mirror to locate hidden rewards, even in novel locations. After habituation trials, they
never attended to their own reflections, dithered between the image and the object, nor attempted to
retrieve the mirror image. They were also unable to find the objects in the absence of a mirror. Their
behavior, however, did differ in some ways.
Ala's data suggest that she learned to use a mirror to access the rewarded location. In tests with three
choices, her accuracy increased rapidly with the number of trials and remained fairly constant until a
period in which she received no trials. Her subsequent decrease in accuracy and recovery after additional
trials suggest that she might have temporarily forgotten how to perform the task.
She did, however, transfer to modified conditions on the very first trials. She maintained her accuracy
when faced with four, rather than three, possible sites. This task represented only a small change, but the
data suggest that she had not simply learned a rote behavior. Such a conclusion is supported by her
accuracy on the task in which she had to look above, rather than below, to obtain her reward.
Kyaaro's data were statistically significant on the three-and four-position tasks, but he did exhibit position
preferences. His behavior with respect to end sites is like that of "attention-deficit disordered" (ADD)
children (Barkley, 1990). Given match-to-sample tasks with linearly arranged choices, ADD children
preferentially choose middle objects; if, however, choice objects are arranged in a triangle, ADD children
choose appropriately (D. Sherman, personal communication, February, 1994}. Thus, ADD children look
straight ahead, ignoring end positions. Although Kyaaro first looked at an end in the mirror, possibly
because of his eye placement, he often chose middle positions. Note that he exhibits other ADD-like
behavior (Barkley, 1990; Pepperberg, 1994b}. For example, his accuracy improves when "activities ...
involve an immediate consequence for completing them" (Barkley, 1990, p. 2). Thus, after experiencing
trials that provided greater incentives to attend to mirror cues about all possible compartments (i.e.,

negative items in some sites), his pattern of errors changed. His improvement was not likely a
consequence of having more trials, as his position preference did not alter with trial number during the
original three-position task.
Table 3. Kyaaro 's Position Preferences in Mirror-Mediated Searches
No. of times Kyaaro chose each site
Pasta location

A

B

C

A
B

38

1

1

6

33

1

C

5

14

21

Whether ADD caused Kyaaro's inability to habituate to the overhead apparatus is unclear. He did not,
however, fail because of an inability to use a mirror. We have yet to devise an equivalent transfer
situation to which he will habituate.
We note that according to some researchers (Anderson, 1986; Povinelli, 1989) the data just discussed
are evidence for visio-spatial problem-solving skills. The birds' refusals to search in the mirror's absence
could, however, suggest that (a) a mirror had become a cue to search or (b) they recognized that a
search in the mirror's absence was useless. In the first case, a bird is simply associating events; in the
second case, it is engaged in information processing. The data do not conclusively support the latter
interpretation, but the birds' successes on mirror-mediated object discrimination tasks, both before and,
for Kyaaro, after spatial locating, suggest that a mirror was not simply a trigger to search. Here they did
not interact with their mirror image, but immediately obtained pasta; thus they did not succeed merely
because they happened to see the pasta while interacting with their image. They responded at a level of
accuracy not unlike that of 3-year-old children but without the verbal and physical prompts children
receive to attend to the apparatus (Field & Hogg, 1992). In sum, the data suggest that the subjects do
indeed understand that the mirror provides a representation (i.e., understand the basic function of the
mirror and are not merely engaged in mirror-triggered search).
General Discussion
Two Grey parrots engaged in mirror-image stimulation, mirror-mediated object discrimination, and mirrormediated spatial locating. While viewing their mirror images, they exhibited behavior patterns similar to
those of marmosets, monkeys, very young children (<18 months}, and the initial responses of orangutans
and young chimpanzees. In object discrimination and spatial locating tasks, Grey parrots used mirrors to
discriminate among exemplars and locate hidden objects. Even Kyaaro, who exhibited certain position
preferences (possibly a consequence of an attention deficit disorder), performed at a statistically
significant level. The parrots' transfers to novel situations show that they were not simply engaging in
mirror-triggered search. These birds are the first nonmammalian subjects to use mirrors successfully in
both these tasks; they performed at levels similar to those of monkeys (Itakura, 1987) and 2-year-old
children (Robinson et al., 1990) on discrimination tasks and to 3-year-old children (Field & Hogg, 1992)
and possibly elephants (Povinelli, 1989} on locating tasks. Overall, the data suggest that Grey parrots can
indeed process mirror information: They differentiate reflective versus nonreflective information and use a
representation to locate hidden objects.
Whether Grey parrots will ultimately succeed on more complex mirror tasks (mirror-guided reaching, mark
tests) remains to be seen. Unfortunately, we cannot easily administer the same mark test or guided
reaching tasks that have been used with apes and monkeys: Grey parrots, unlike apes and monkeys, do

not often use their feet either to explore their bodies or to investigate items. As in research with dolphins
(Marino et al., 1994), our work must therefore focus on conceptual rather than technical similarities in
tests among species.
The mark test is likely to prove particularly difficult to administer. Although parrots use visual information
to identify objects (e.g., Pepperherg, 1983, 1990a, 1992) and at least one psittacid--the budgerigar
(Melopsittacus undulates)---uses visual information to recognize conspecifics (Brown & Dooling, 1993;
Trillmich, 1976), we have only limited evidence to suggest that a parrot will attend to an unusual mark
either on itself or a conspecific companion. We are, however, examining how preening behavior might be
used to develop mark tests.
Because parrots lack many (but not all) the behavior patterns associated with forearms and hands in
apes and monkeys, mirror-guided reaching tasks also must be adapted to psittacine anatomy. We are
thus examining whether parrots can solve patterned string problems (e.g., Ducker & Rensch, 1976),
which could be adapted for monitoring their progress in a mirror (see Brown, McDowell, & Robinson,
1965, for a similar study with monkeys). Only then will we learn whether an avian species possesses
complex visio-spatial problem-solving abilities analogous to those of mammals.
The question will, however, always be whether adapted tests truly replicate those presented to other
species (see Eglash & Snowdon, 1983; Marino et al., 1994; Pepperberg & Kozak, 1986). Like studies of
language- and counting-like behavior in animals (e.g., Pepperberg, 1994a), studies of mirror use can
always be interpreted in ways that emphasize differences rather than similarities in, or continuities
among, species (e.g., Heyes, 1994). Whatever the interpretations, cross-species data, such as those
obtained here, provide critical information about cognitive abilities present or absent in nonhumans.

Notes
1

Note, however, that Amsterdam's (1972) experiments to examine self-awareness in children lacked
many of the controls used by Gallup (1970) in his animal studies (see Gallup & Povinelli, 1993). Thus only
her observations, but not her conclusions, can be compared directly with the animal data.
2

Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner (1981) purported to study self-awareness in the pigeon; their project,
however, merely demonstrated that subjects could be taught to peck at a specific target observed in a
mirror. Whether the pigeons understood the correlation between the image in the mirror and themselves
was not proven. See Gallup and Suarez {1986) for a detailed critique and citation of a report that failed to
replicate the Epstein et al. study.
3

During the period in which we were running all our experiments, both birds-but particularly Kyaaro--often
split the skin on their breast bone during clumsy landings. These mishaps required surgical repair, and
the birds subsequently wore plastic "Elizabethan" collars for 1 to 3 weeks to keep them from tearing at the
stitches. These collars restricted their maneuverability and mobility and thus prevented tests of mirror use.
Moreover, after each surgery, Alo became more difficult to handle and eventually could not be handled by
the students who were performing the tests. During these studies, both birds were also diagnosed as
having psittacosis; treatment involved weekly 1.6 cc intramuscular shots. Birds were lethargic for 24 hr
after a shot.
4

We used horizontal presentations to see whether the birds would react at all. We did not continue with
such trials to avoid training the birds on horizontal presentations before testing their ability to use a
horizontal mirror to locate objects.

5

We used a go/no-go procedure for habituation rather than positive-negative stimuli for two reasons.
First, our parrots tend to be neophobic (Pepperberg, 1987), and any negative stimuli might have
prevented their habituation. Second, switching to positive-negative trials without training provided a way
to separate habituation and test trials.
6

Our protocol called for 30 trials, but 3 additional trials were done by mistake.

7

The different procedures reflected the schedule of the students assigned to each bird. Our protocol
called for 60 blind trials for Alo, but 2 additional trials were done by mistake. Because Kyaaro's results in
Experiment 2 were affected by the number of trials he received, we ran 30 additional trials to see whether
his results would similarly be affected in Experiment 3.
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